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Two centuries separate our Federal Constitution (1988) – an 
analytical constitution – from the United States Constitution (1787), a 
concise document. 
The American Constitution, which employs the technique of 
saying as little as possible, dedicates only one article to Judicial Power. In 
Section I, Article III, there is reference to only one supreme Court. It 
gives the ordinary legislature (Congress) the power of creation and 
alteration, as well as the power to extinguish other federal courts (inferior 
Courts). Generally stated, it guarantees the judges permanency in their 
position and an irreducible salary1. One can see that the Philadelphia 
Statute establishes principles. There are two highly significant principles: 
greater protection for the plaintiff and for the defendant than for the judge 
as well as security from political manipulation. The American Constitution, 
generally stated, is not concerned with the norm of complementary 
principles2. Furthermore, there are constitutional principles present that 
cannot be found explicitly in the political text. 
                                                 
1 Art. III, § I: The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
2 The distinction between “principle” and “norm” is not pacific (See GOMES CANOTILHO, 
José Joaquim. Direito Constitucional. 4. ed. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1987, p. 119). 
A11  
* Aposentado do cargo de Ministro do STJ, a partir de 13/11/1998. 
Brief notes on the principle of the publicity of judgments in the Federal Supreme Court of 
Brazil and in the United States Supreme Court 
 
 
 
2 
Throughout the years, notably since Marbury v. Madison 
(1803)3, it has been the duty of the Judiciary and, in particular, the 
Supreme Court, to interpret and apply laws while adhering to the 
Constitution. In relation to this “Silent Constitution” and to the concision 
of many of its expressive clauses4, the judicial courts take on the difficult 
responsibility of strengthening constitutional principles and norms, though 
often faced with contradiction and disharmony. 
The Brazilian Constituency of 1988, while legislating for other 
people from other lands and other times, did not made constitutional law 
the principles, but also the norms of secondary nature. The historical-
political exigency, in truth, had already changed. The time was different. 
In the “General Dispositions” of the chapter referring to 
“Judiciary Power”, through ways previously drawn up in the caput of 
article 37, our Constitution states in article 93: 
IX – all judgments of the bodies of the Judicial Power shall 
be public, and all the decisions shall be justified, under 
penalty of nullity, and the law may, if the public interest 
demands it, limit the presence, in given acts, to the 
interested parties and their lawyers, or only to the latter. 
There is no doubt that the text transcribed above has a large 
political and democratic significance. There is a historical explanation: the 
majority of judges in the 18th century were arbitrary and corrupt.5 In 
France, for example, the judges of the Ancien Régime were “owners” of 
their positions. Due to this, they could sell or bequeath these positions.6 
                                                 
3 Unquestionably, Marbury is a one of the most important rulings of the Supreme Court. 
It is treated as a “super-precedent” that acquired constitutional status (See TRIBE, 
Laurence H. The Invisible Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 19). 
4 Such as the religious and free speech clauses of the First Amendment. 
5 Beccaria (1738-1794), in his time, was one of the paladins against the judiciary system. 
6 See DAVID, René. Os Grandes Sistemas do Direito Contemporâneo. 2. ed. Trad. 
Hermínio A. Carvalho. Lisboa: Editora Meridiano, Limitada, p. 156. See GODECHOT, 
Jacques. A Revolução Francesa: Cronologia Comentada (1787-1791). Trad. Julieta Leite. 
Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1989, p. 19. On February 23, 1771, the chancellor 
Maupeou (1714-1792) implemented a provision that extinguished the privacy of the 
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Our monk Vicente do Salvador (1546-1639), in reference to the conduct 
of “Land Judges” (ordinary elected judges), affirmed that to obtain favors 
you need only “four boxes of sugar to bend the Rod of Justice”.7 From this 
we see the value of the exigencies of the Brazilian constitutional device, 
insuring the transparency of public acts and, especially, the judges’ 
decisions. It is probable that our Constitution of 1988 was directly based 
on the principle of the publicity of public acts and of the publicity of court 
hearings, both clearly acclaimed in the Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic (art. 122nd, g, and art. 209th, respectively). With the publicity of 
judicial acts in hearings and official journals, political arcana are avoided: 
judicial decisions, save in exceptional cases provided by law, cannot be 
kept secret. All parties have the right to know the decisions that are 
reached. Therefore, the judgments are divulged, not only in the interest of 
those involved, but also in the interest of society as a whole. On the other 
hand, the principle of juridical security is also an issue. In the case of the 
North American Constitution – the paradigm of all existing constitutions – 
all responsibility belongs to the ordinary legislature and to the judiciary 
itself, both of whom directly know how to evaluate and regulate present-
day social pressures.  In the case of the Supreme Court – the only court 
with constitutional status –, its Rules detail the procedural norms.8 There 
are many devices of customary law. One of these devices, which would 
suffer as unconstitutional in Brazil, as it goes against the “principle of 
ample publicity”, is in the delivery of the judgment. On one side, the 
lawyers defend their clients openly before the Court en banc (Rule 28, I), 
but afterwards, the judgment takes place in secret, far from the public 
eye. It actually takes place behind closed doors. Disagreement and 
animosity between judges is inevitable in the heat of discussion, but it 
                                                                                                                                                        
judge’s position (Parliament). Provisions should be made by the government. On 
November 12, 1774, Louis XVI restored the privileges (See GODECHOT, cit. work, p. 28). 
7 Apud GUIMARAES, Mário. O Juiz e a Função Jurisdicional 1 ed. Rio: Forense, 1958, p. 
31. 
8 The U.S. Supreme Court Rules pass through periodic alterations. The revision of July 
17, 2007 was enforced on October 1, 2007. 
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then dies between the Brethren.9 It does not go beyond this point. Even 
the Clerk of the Court is not present at the sessions taking place in the 
conference room. Distrust? No, precaution and prudence! Curiously, there 
are rules that have a comic flavor: the conference room door stays locked, 
and if anyone, for any reason, knocks on this door, it is the job of the 
Junior Associate Justice to answer…10 Once the judicial issue is resolved, 
the result is summarized and, finally, disclosed (Rule 41). Some publicity 
has occurred, but in a restricted form. 
American democracy – an English inheritance – has a religious 
base. It was built between equals,11 and it gradually solidified through 
patience and caution. Our democracy took on a different form, and due to 
antecedent autocrats,12 there were a series of intermittencies. Because of 
this, our democratic manifestations are more pronounced and even more 
radical. I will present two examples, past and present. 
During the elaboration of the Philadelphia Constitution (1787), 
the secrecy of the discussions between the delegates was one of the first 
                                                 
9 Often, disagreements have a more profound basis. This occurred with the sullen and 
prejudiced Justice McReynolds (1862-1946), who did not tolerate liberal judges and was 
extremely anti-Semitic. He refused to speak to his colleague Justice Brandeis (1856-
1941). His racism was so pronounced that, for the official Court photograph in 1924, he 
refused to attend so as to avoid being near Brandeis. The Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court simply cancelled the photo session… (See ABRAHAM, Henry J. The Judicial Process: 
an Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France. 5. ed. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 206). The hatred of James C. McReynolds 
returned in 1939: he did not attend the Robing Ceremony of Felix Frankfurter (ibidem, p. 
207). He decided not to speak to Benjamin Cardozo, another Jew… 
10 See SCHWARTZ, Bernard. A History of the Supreme Court. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 319. 
11 Octavio Paz, a Mexican intellectual essayist, made a profound observation about 
Spanish Catholicism and English Protestantism during the time of the American 
colonization. English society was “exclusive”, Spanish “inclusive”. During this dominance, 
the Englishman was not interested in converting the natives. He wanted separation, and 
even elimination. What resulted was the construction of a society between equals; 
already the Spaniard (due to the Portuguese colonizer) was preoccupied with conversion, 
establishing a strong hierarchy between the conquerors and the conquered (Tempos 
Nublados. Trad. Sônia Régis. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1983, p. 190). 
12 The Brazilian State was not born in a liberal environment. “Born and lulled to sleep, 
most appropriately, beneath the sign of illustrated absolutism” (NEVES, Lúcia Maria 
Bastos Pereira das. Corcundas e Constitucionais: a Cultura Política da Independência 
(1820-1822). Rio de Janeiro: Renavan, 2003, p. 418). 
Brief notes on the principle of the publicity of judgments in the Federal Supreme Court of 
Brazil and in the United States Supreme Court 
 
 
 
5 
rules established. The delegates feared that if the public had access to the 
process of the convention, they would not understand the true nature of 
the discussions and would become politically embittered. James Madison, 
by this time thirty-six years old, sat beside William Jackson, the official 
secretary of the constituency, and made daily notes following the 
discussions between his peers. While alive, Madison refused to make his 
notes public. In 1837, his widow sold them to the Library of Congress, but 
they were only disclosed (incomplete) five years later. 
In Brazil, during the first Empire, the discussions between the 
constituents were noted in shorthand and disclosed immediately.13 This 
was sufficient for the young emperor D. Pedro I to close the General 
Constituency and Legislative Assembly. 
The other example, recent, involves presenting the disclosures 
of major constitutional questions judged by the Federal Supreme Court, 
such as Mensalão, Células-Tronco and Raposa Serra do Sol, on television 
or online. There is no doubt that society needs to know what is happening 
in their justice courts; what is being discussed, supported, and decided. It 
is a legitimate exercise of citizenship and inspection of a non-elected 
power. 
Here lies the question: until what point is it democratically 
good to have a judgment transmitted live on television if often times the 
judge is not in accordance with his colleagues? Does the public need to 
know the interna corporis disagreements or would it be more interesting 
for the institutions to have the same defense as the American courts? 
                                                 
13 See MENCK, José Theodoro Mascarenhas. A Liberdade Religiosa e o Parlamento 
Imperial Brasileiro (1823-1889). Brasília: Editora Ser, 1996, p. 13. 
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